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(1) Introduction
Switzerland is a member of neither the European
Union («EU») nor the European Economic Area
(«EEA»). Swiss law is nonetheless strongly influ-
enced by EU law. Switzerland is bound to apply
the relevant acquis under several agreements con-
cluded with the EU (so-called «direct» Euro-
peanization). Even outside the scope of these
agreements, it adopts legislation that mirrors rules
and principles of EU law (so-called «indirect»
Europeanization).1
Some use the label «autonomous implemen-
tation» as a synonym for indirect Europeaniza-
tion as a whole. Swiss authorities «implement» (or
rather reproduce) elements of EU law in national
legislation, and they do so «autonomously», i.e.
without international obligations.2 Others, includ-
ing the Swiss Supreme Court, reserve the label
«autonomous implementation» for something
more specific: the adoption of national legislation
that mirrors EU law because it aims to achieve
euro-compatibility.3 This narrower definition
distinguishes autonomous implementation from
«mere inspiration» from EU regulatory models,
such as in the Swiss Internal Market Act,4 which is
modelled on EU law but does not aim to achieve
euro-compatibility.
Based on this narrower definition, I will pre -
sent in sections 2 and 3 the legislative and judicial
practice relating to the autonomous implementa-
tion of EU law in Switzerland, and formulate a few
concluding remarks in section 4. Given that euro-
compatibility is the central consideration behind
autonomous implementation, one would expect
Swiss authorities to have devised legislative and
hermeneutical techniques guaranteeing a high
degree of fidelity to EU «mother law». That is not
the case, at least for the time being. As we will
see, much is lost in the translation from EU
law to Swiss law.
(2) The legislative policy of autonomous im-
plementation
(a) The evolving rationales and forms of au-
tonomous implementation 
The policy of autonomously implementing EU law
in Switzerland officially began in 1988. In the Re-
port on European integration published that year,
the government suggested that Swiss legislation
should, to all possible extent, be made euro-com-
patible in «the fields of law having a trans-bound-
ary dimension», e.g. in the field of product regula-
tions, «(and only in those fields)».5 As a tool for
informed decision-making, the government also
introduced the practice of systematically screen-
ing the EU-compatibility of its own legislative pro-
posals.6
The entry into force of the EEA Agreement, of
which Switzerland was originally a signatory
State, would have made it largely unnecessary to
unilaterally implement the acquis.7 However,
Swiss voters rejected the EEA Agreement in De-
cember 1992. Thereafter, the policy of au-
tonomous implementation took on a whole new
dimension. The Swisslex package, launched in
1993 and completed by a second round of re-
forms in 1995, laid the foundations for a euro-
compatible Swiss economic order. Legislation was
passed in wide-ranging fields, inter alia techni-
cal standards, intellectual property, consumer pro-
tection, and labour law, in order to transpose
Community law into Swiss law.8
At that point, the qualification that euro-compati-
0-bility would only be sought in «fields having a
trans-boundary dimension» had largely been
dropped. In the government’s own words, the
«euro-compatibility» of Swiss legislation had be-
come a «fundamental principle»,9 to the extent
that by 1999 the autonomous implementation of
EU law had become «systematic». Indeed, it was
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noted that «[i]n practice, the Parliament and Gov-
ernment adopt[ed] measures that [were] not
[euro-] compatible only in exceptional cases».10
It is worth noting that this statement essentially re-
ferred to economic law. At the time, this was prac-
tically the sole object of Community law. More-
over, the policy of autonomous imple -
mentation was (and still is) mainly driven by
an economic rationale of facilitating the inte-
gration of the Swiss economy into the EU internal
market by minimizing barriers, compliance costs
and distortions of competition generated by regu-
latory divergences.11
In the 2000s, changes in the political and legal
context led to speculation that the heyday of au-
tonomous implementation had passed.12 First, the
political complexion of the government became
less «euro-friendly». Accordingly, in the Europe
2006 Report, expressions such as «systematic im-
plementation of EU law» were discarded in favour
of more guarded language: «[t]he autonomous
implementation of EU law is only pursued when
this is justified or required by Swiss economic in-
terest (competitiveness) […].  In some areas, […]
Swiss legislation deviates from EU law and
Switzerland retains its autonomy by applying, for
instance, lower VAT rates».13
Secondly, from 2002 onwards many agreements
with the EU started coming into force. This was
seen to reduce the need for, or indeed the attrac-
tiveness of, autonomous implementation. The
government itself pointed out that «the approxi-
mation to Community law should not be done
unilaterally, but rather on the basis of agree-
ments».14 This preference is easily explained, since
the autonomous implementation of EU law can
minimize distortions of competition and reduce to
some extent trade barriers, but not secure market
access.15
In spite of all this, and even though it must be con-
ceded that the heroic era of the Swisslex package
was indeed behind, the autonomous implementa-
tion of EU law has continued unabated over the
last decade. «Classic» autonomous implementa-
tion – i.e. harmonisation driven by a market ra-
tionale – was vigorously pursued in the 2003-
2007 parliament.16 New forms of autonomous
implementation have also been introduced, such
as the unilateral application of the «Cassis
de Dijon» principle to products lawfully mar-
keted in the EEA.17
Most interestingly perhaps, recent legislative prac-
tice has, in some cases, belied the central ideas un-
derpinning the government’s statements quoted
above – that the autonomous implementation of
EU law has a strictly economic focus, and that it
should be abandoned as more agreements are
concluded. To begin with, agreements with the EU
may not mandate harmonisation yet establish
forms of cooperation that stimulate autonomous
implementation, including in non-economic
areas. The association of Switzerland to the so-
called «Dublin system» is a case in point. The rele-
vant agreement does not require Switzerland to
apply EU asylum standards, but its «network
logic» generates a functional pressure for Switzer-
land to autonomously implement them.18 The
logic of equality may also come into play to the
same effect. The agreements with the EU may
generate reverse discrimination and create pres-
sure for Switzerland to unilaterally extend the
scope of EU-derived «bilateral» rules to purely in-
ternal situations. This is the rationale behind provi-
sions such as Article 4 § 3bis and 6 of the Internal
Market Act,19 or Article 42 of the Foreigners Act.20
These examples suggest that as the economic, so-
cietal and contractual relations between Switzer-
land and the EU become denser, the policy of au-
tonomous implementation remains relevant and
tends, moreover, to gain new forms, new ratio-
nales and new territories, even beyond the tradi-
tional (and still dominant) market-oriented logic.
(b) Taking stock: on the extent and features of au-
tonomous implementation
As it emerges from the previous section, Swiss au-
thorities have been autonomously imple-
menting EU law for more than twenty
years. This notwithstanding, they have so far re-
nounced (or failed) to develop anything like a sys-
tematic approach.
As an entirely voluntary practice, autonomous im-
plementation is subject to no overriding rules. In-
deed, even regularities are hard to come by. The
determination as to whether to seek compatibility
with EU law is a political choice that is made on a
case-by-case basis. How to make Swiss legislation
compatible with EU law is also a matter of ad hoc
choices – be it through the replication of EU provi-
sions in Swiss laws and regulations (often with a
«Swiss drafting polish»)21 or through direct refer-
ences to EU measures (usually in secondary rather
than primary Swiss legislation).22 Even determining
whether a provision truly implements EU law may
be a challenging task since the travaux prépara-
toires are all too often ambiguous on the issue of
whether, why, and to what extent euro-compati-
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rope» is such a sensitive matter in Switzerland,
and policy makers are not inclined to be
too explicit.
All these factors detract from the transparency of
autonomous implementation, and make it diffi-
cult to gauge its true impact. The 2006 proposal
to establish an official «marking», as well as an of-
ficial «census» of national acts implementing EU
law has been rejected on both practical and polit-
ical grounds.23 Scientific efforts to quantify the Eu-
ropeanization of Swiss legislation are on-going,
and their preliminary results are interesting as they
«map» the most affected legal and policy fields.
However, due to the methodological difficulties
involved, the estimates of what proportion of
Swiss law implements EU law are still rather tenta-
tive. One point is nonetheless rarely disputed: the
autonomous implementation of EU law
is a large-scale phenomenon, concerning a
sizeable share of internal legislation.24
From the standpoint of legal homogeneity – not
an irrelevant consideration, given that euro-com-
patibility is the overarching aim of autonomous
implementation – current practice suffers
from two main shortcomings.25
First of all, the implementation of EU law is nearly
always selective. The Swiss legislator may
choose to make a Federal Act wholly compatible
with EU law, to make certain deviations from EU
law or, conversely, to make just certain approxima-
tions in an otherwise «purely Swiss» Act.  
Secondly, it is static. Swiss norm-givers generally
refrain from legislating in a way that would allow
Swiss law to evolve in parallel to EU mother law
(such as through dynamic references).26 Moreover,
they do not systematically follow-up on the evolu-
tion of EU mother law. As a result, legislation that
has been made euro-compatible may well – and
often does – become «euro-incompatible» over
time. For instance, the 1993 Product Liability Act,
transposing Directive 85/374, was updated to Di-
rective 1999/34 after a 10 years delay.27 Article
333 of the Code of Obligations, reformulated in
1994 to transpose the old Employees’ Acquired
Rights Directive (Directive 77/187), has never sub-
sequently been updated.28 Article 42 of the
Foreigners Act, which, as already noted, aims
to avoid reverse discrimination in matters of fami-
ly reunification, has spectacularly failed to achieve
its purpose precisely on account of its static
char acter. Its wording reproduces in detail the
restrictive interpretation of free movement law
prevalent at the time of its drafting. In the mean-
time, however, ECJ case law has evolved in a
liberal sense, and the Swiss Supreme Court has
followed suit in interpreting the Free Movement
of Persons Agreement. As a consequence, reverse
discrimination has reappeared.29
To sum up, it is undisputed that a large (though
still undetermined) proportion of Swiss legislation
aims to implement EU law. However, this is done
in a way that is often ambiguous, and almost in-
variably creates imperfect replicas.
(3) The autonomous implementation of EU
law before the Swiss Supreme Court
(a) Background issues
The legislative policy of autonomous implementa-
tion has placed before Swiss judges a number of
tricky methodological questions and
choices.
The most basic question is whether Swiss provi-
sions implementing EU law are to be interpreted in
conformity with EU case law and practice. A
round «no» might appear justified on formal
grounds. After all, the object of interpretation is
domestic law, while EU law (including case law
and practice) is foreign law.30 Such a position is,
however, barely tenable since it completely disre-
gards the teleological element of interpretation, in
casu, the euro-compatibility aims pursued by the
legislator. With more nuance, one could posit that
since Swiss judges traditionally make comparative
references to foreign law,31 they may, a fortiori,
consider ECJ case law when interpreting provi-
sions that purport to implement EU law. This ap-
proach – which the Swiss Supreme Court usually
follows when dealing with provisions that are
merely «inspired» by EU law32 – defuses the hard
methodological questions raised by autonomous
implementation. It allows EU legal materials to be
taken into account, but it does not commit the
judge to EU (i.e. foreign) law. At the same time, it
does not in any way guarantee that the goal of
euro-compatibility will be attained in practice. It
also gives judges unfettered discretion in the use
of EU legal materials for the interpretation of a
sizeable share of national legislation – hardly an
ideal solution from the standpoint of legal certain-
ty.
The third hermeneutical option is, of course, to ac-
cept that provisions whose purpose is to achieve
euro-compatibility must also be interpreted in a
euro-compatible way. However, once this is ac-
cepted – as a self-standing hermeneutical princi-
ple, as an instance of teleological interpretation,
or on other grounds33 – a number of other issues
appear. On a purely practical level, it may not
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be easy to determine whether the provi-
sion at hand truly implements EU law. As
already noted, Swiss legislation may imperfectly
reflect EU mother law, and even a careful exami-
nation of the travaux préparatoires may not yield
conclusive results. Autonomous implementation,
like beauty, is all too often in the eye of the be-
holder.
A more principled issue is how to balance the prin-
ciple of euro-compatible interpretation with other
principles of interpretation, in particular with liter-
al interpretation. Is it allowed (or required) to dis-
regard textual discrepancies between the Swiss
«copy» and the EU «original»? Or is a minor «hel-
vetism» enough to disable the duty of euro-com-
patible interpretation? In considering this ques-
tion, one should again bear in mind the points
made above: the will of the legislator may be elu-
sive, and «helvetisms» may equally be due to
mere drafting reasons or to a real will to differ.
Another principled, connected, issue is whether
euro-compatible interpretation must be static or
dynamic. As pointed out before, EU law evolves
and Swiss provisions implementing it often do
not. Should the judge disregard subsequent EU
law and so defer to the will of the historic legisla-
tor, at the cost of renouncing to real euro-compat-
ibility? Or rather act on the basis of an implicit
mandate to realize euro-compatibility over time,
absent contrary indications? And if so, to what ex-
tent? If subsequent EU law flies in the face of the
wording of Swiss provisions, should it still orient
their interpretation34?
(b) The answers of the Swiss Supreme Court: «Ac-
quired Rights» and its progeny
The first published judgment of the Supreme
Court dealing with the issues detailed above is the
2003 «Acquired Rights» case35. The case
turned on the interpretation of Article 333 of the
Code of Obligations, mentioned above.36 The
Supreme Court first held that «[d]omestic law that
has been autonomously adapted to EU law must,
in doubt, be interpreted in an «euro-compatible»
manner […]. [W]hen the Swiss legal order is
adapted to a foreign legal order – here EU law –
harmonization must not be sought only in the for-
mulation of the norm, but also in its interpretation
and application, insofar as this is permitted by the
methods of interpretation that must be observed
under national law». Secondly, it held that «the in-
terpreter must [not only consider the legal situa-
tion known to the legislator, but] also keep an eye
on the subsequent development of the law with
which harmonization is sought».37
The language of the Court is both bold
and prudent. It is bold, inasmuch as it creates ex
nihilo a duty of euro-compatible interpretation,
and espouses a dynamic conception of euro-com-
patibility. It is prudent, inasmuch as it makes clear
that euro-compatible interpretation is a subsidiary
means of interpretation that can be trumped by
other considerations (e.g. text and context), and
that there is no strict obligation to follow subse-
quent developments of EU law. 
It is also worth noting that the judgment uses
very open-textured language. Indeed, two
of the judges that took part in its drafting went on
to give sharply different readings of its implica-
tions in scientific articles.38
Since the «Acquired Rights» case, the Supreme
Court has rendered a few published judgments on
euro-compatible interpretation, which are occa-
sionally «bold» but more frequently «prudent». In
Métropole television, it relied on subse-
quent EU legislation to solve a contentious
issue of Copyright law, absent a clear legislative
intent to make Swiss law compatible with EU
law.39 In Sat1, it emphasised an (arguably minor)
divergence between the Swiss provisions on spon-
soring and subsequent EU law, and maintained
that the former could not be interpreted in con-
formity with the latter40 – even though the travaux
préparatoires clearly hinted at euro-compatibility
as a means to avoid distortions of competition to
the detriment of Swiss firms.41 The Court went on
to note that «the corrections to Swiss Broadcast-
ing law that might be needed [in order to avoid
distortions of competition] cannot be brought by
way of interpretation, since the legislature has
very recently decided to maintain the pre-existing
Swiss provisions».42
The last chapter in the saga – the Swiss-
com judgment, rendered in April 201143 – is
noteworthy in several respects and deserves a
closer look. Swisscom AG sought the annulment
of a fine imposed by the Competition Commission
(«COMCO») for abuse of dominant position. The
relevant provision of the Cartel Act44 closely fol-
lows the wording of the TFEU and of ECJ case law,
and COMCO applied it in conformity with EU
practice in finding that Swisscom had «imposed
unfair […] prices» on its competitors. COMCO
maintained that it was sufficient to establish a
dominant position and the unfairness of prices,
without the need to prove that Swisscom had ac-
tually threatened or coerced its counterparts.
The Court started by citing the «Acquired Rights»
principle that provisions implementing EU law




ought to be interpreted in a euro-compatible
manner.45 This was not banal: a public law division
of the Supreme Court had never before cited «Ac-
quired Rights» as good precedent in published
case law. 
However, the Court went on to rule that the pro-
visions at hand did not implement EU law, essen-
tially on the strength of two arguments. On the
one hand, the Court quoted a passage of the gov-
ernment’s explanatory memorandum stating that
the adoption of the Cartel Act had not taken place
«on grounds of European policy»46. On the other
hand, it observed that «Swiss [Competition] law
does not correspond fully to EU [Competition]
law».47
With due respect, neither argument adequately
supports the Court’s conclusion. The first argu-
ment is based on a rather selective reading of the
travaux préparatoires. In other passages of the ex-
planatory memorandum to the Cartel Act, the
government had made it quite clear that (a) the
Act takes into account EU law «save where, for
very precise reasons, other solutions had to be
chosen»48, and that (b) following EU law in Com-
petition law is not merely a matter of inspiration,
but serves the purpose of minimizing compliance
costs for undertakings that are active both in
Switzerland and the EU.49 These passages suggest
that even though the Act was not passed «on
grounds of European policy», euro-compatibility
was indeed an important consideration in its
drafting. As to the second argument, the Supreme
Court was of course right in pointing out that
some provisions of the Cartel Act deviate from EU
law such as the provisions on agreements be-
tween undertakings. But this does not detract
from the fact that the provisions on the abuse of
dominant positions are a carbon copy of EU law.
Not content with denying that Swiss law imple-
mented EU law, the Court went on to give its own
(euro-incompatible) interpretation of the Act after
a perfunctory side-glance to ECJ case law. This
was also quite surprising. One would have at least
expected it to take notice of the manifest «Euro-
pean» inspiration of the provisions, and to per-
form a fuller comparative analysis of ECJ case
law.50
To sum up, in Swisscom the Supreme Court took
one step forward and two steps back in
terms of euro-compatible interpretation. It has
formally recognized the «Acquired Rights» case as
a valid precedent in public law. At the same time,
it has narrowed its scope dramatically by disre-
garding substantial – though admittedly not un-
equivocal – evidence that the provisions at hand
indeed implemented EU law. Finally, Supreme
Court failed to at least take the «comparative»
hint provided by parallel wording.
It is yet to be seen whether this restrictive ap-
proach will set the standard in the future, or
whether there will be further twists and turns in
the Supreme Court’s complicated relationship
with euro-compatibility.
(4) Conclusion
The autonomous implementation of EU law is a
large-scale exercise in free (legal) trans-
lation. «Free» to the extent that it is voluntary –
at least from a legal, formal standpoint. «Free»,
also, to the extent the lawmaker and the judge
perform it without a framework of supporting
principles and rules being guided only by the over-
arching aim of euro-compatibility.
The first conclusion is inescapable. «Free»
translation does not come anywhere
near true implementation in terms of
legal homogeneity. While the autonomous
implementation of EU law is no doubt an impor-
tant transformative force for the Swiss legal order,
the sense of the original mother law is lost to a
considerable extent. Legislation itself is almost in-
variably an imperfect replica: selectivity and fos-
silization prevent «high fidelity». The end result of
autonomous implementation is thus hybrid «EU-
ized» Swiss legislation that stands apart from ordi-
nary Swiss legislation both legally and politically,
but is not quite the same as EU law.51 The case law
of the Supreme Court, for its part, is obviously in-
sufficient (and actually does not attempt) to cor-
rect this «imperfection». It is true that the
Supreme Court has established a principle of
euro-compatible interpretation that is open to dy-
namic application. But clearly, euro-compatibility
is a weak hermeneutical principle. The inactivity of
the legislator, coupled to real, or supposed, textu-
al impediments in the law, may be enough to dis-
suade Supreme Court Judges from pursuing judi-
cial euro-compatibility. Moreover, as the Swisscom
judgment indicates, it may even take less: slight
ambiguities in the travaux préparatoires may rule
out the euro-compatible interpretation of provi-
sions that have been copied from EU law with a
rather evident compatibility rationale in mind.
Fidelity to the original is not the only thing that
is lost in translation. The second, more tenta-
tive conclusion that I would like to suggest is that
legal security is also adversely impacted in the 
operation of the law. 
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We now know that special interpretive rules apply
to the provisions that implement EU law – a size-
able part of Swiss legislation. But, the application
of such special rules appears to be far from consis-
tent. Many key choices are left to the intuition and
inclinations of the deciding judge: how will he
read the travaux préparatoires and provisions
when, as is so often the case, they are less than
straightforward on the issue of euro-compatibili-
ty? How far is he disposed to stretch the wording
of the provisions at hand in order to make euro-
compatibility work? Will he accept to give weight
to subsequent legislation, or will he stick to an
«originalist» reading of the legislator’s intentions?
In Métropole, weakly EU-ized provisions have
been interpreted in conformity with subsequent
EU Directives. In Swisscom, strongly EU-ized provi-
sions have been interpreted in a purely «national»
fashion. Indeed, in its present state, the case law
of the Supreme Court suggests a provoking ques-
tion: when we speak about the «euro-compatibile
interpretation» of Swiss law, do we refer to a prin-
ciple for Swiss judges to apply, or rather to a «wild
card» for Swiss judges to use at their discretion? 
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